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- Social Anxiety: Friendship and the Problem of Belonging in the Modern Political Order - 3,716 views
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Since writing my post on the blogosphere and democracy I’ve been searching for good scholarly treatments of the topic and today I found an exceptionally interesting piece by Cass Sunstein titled, “Neither Hayek nor Habermas“. His arguments are quite consistent with the ones that I make in my post and reveal the need for a substantive and realistic assessment of the impact the blogosphere is having on democratic discourse.
“Neither Hayek nor Habermas”
Cass R. Sunstein
Public Choice (2008) 134: 87-95
“The rise of the blogosphere raises important questions about the elicitation and aggregation of information, and about democracy itself. Do blogs allow people to check information and correct errors? Can we understand the blogosphere as operating as a kind of marketplace for information along Hayekian terms? Or is it a vast public meeting of the kind that Jurgen Habermas describes? In this article, I argue that the blogosphere cannot be understood as a Hayekian means for gathering dispersed knowledge because it lacks any equivalent of the price system. I also argue that forces of polarization characterize the blogosphere as they do other social interactions, making it an unlikely venue for Habermasian deliberation, and perhaps leading to the creation of information cocoons. I conclude by briefly canvassing partial responses to the problem of polarization.”
Is the Internet Changing Our Conception of Democracy? An Analysis of the Internet Use During Protests and its Effect on the Perception of Democracy
Department of Political Science, University College London
APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper
During 2010-2011 we have seen the rise of social movements around the globe. The student protests in UK, the Arab Spring in the Middle East, the Indignados in Spain, the student demonstrations in Chile and other Latin American countries, and the Occupy Wall Street movement – which has been replicated in different cities across the US and abroad. They represent different sectorial and political aspirations, but all of them relied heavily on the Internet to communicate and organise. This research analyses two specific contentious processes – the UK student protests and the Chilean environmentalist protests in 2010 – to assess the effect that the Internet may have had on the protesters’ perception of democracy. In both cases, protesters used Twitter and Facebook to communicate with other protesters and to transmit information to mainstream media. Through data gathered from online surveys, interviews, and the Oxford Internet Survey 2009, this article observes the effect of the Internet in two dimensions: support for democracy, and the protesters’ conception of democracy. The data is analysed using methodological triangulation. Several linear and logistic regression models are combined with a qualitative analysis of the interviews. The findings show that the Internet affects the way that people perceive democracy, especially in relation with the concept of democracy between protesters. The evidence points towards the Internet fostering a more horizontal concept of democracy, based on the idea of less hierarchical political organisation. In that regard, respondents tended to connect the use of the Internet with ideas such as referendums, equal participation rights and more horizontal relations between constituents and representatives. This article raises concern about the actual democratic capabilities of the Internet. The question is whether the Internet is inherently democratic or if the observed effect is just the result of a performativity process, fostered by the utopian discourse about the online world.
On this topic check out my reflections on the relationship between the internet and democratic discourse.
David Held is a prominent contemporary democratic theorist who has contributed a great deal to our understanding of cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan democracy, globalization and global governance.
I recently read his book, Models of Democracy, which is an excellent “introduction to central accounts of democracy from classical Greece to the present and a critical discussion of what democracy should mean today.”
“Daniel Kahneman (born March 5, 1934) is an Israeli American psychologist and winner of the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. He is notable for his work on the psychology of judgment and decision-making, behavioral economics and hedonic psychology.
With Amos Tversky and others, Kahneman established a cognitive basis for common human errors using heuristics and biases Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and developed prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). He was awarded the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for his work in prospect theory.
In 2011, he was named by Foreign Policy magazine to its list of top global thinkers. In the same year, his book Thinking, Fast and Slow, which summarizes much of his research, was published and became a best seller.
Daniel Kahneman is considered as father of Behavioral economics.
Currently, he is professor emeritus of psychology and public affairs at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School. Kahneman is a founding partner of The Greatest Good, a business and philanthropy consulting company. He is married to Royal Society Fellow Anne Treisman.”
Kahneman, D.; Tversky, A. (1973). “On the psychology of prediction”. Psychological Review 80 (4): 237–251.
Tversky, A.; Kahneman, D. (1974). “Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases“. Science 185 (4157): 1124–1131.
Kahneman, D.; Tversky, A. (1979). “Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk”. Econometrica 47 (2): 263–291.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. New York: Cambridge University Press.
In the video posted below, philosopher Jonathan Wolff of University College London addresses the problems of political legitimacy; the justness and practicality of exporting elements of liberalism to foreign lands; the compatibility of social justice and economic efficiency; and whether endless economic growth is actually good.
Throughout the video he gives a basic and comprehensible overview of the Rawlsian theory of social justice, but he also points out some oft-neglected issues regarding how we can best actualize such a commitment.
In his discussion of whether we can export elements of liberalism to foreign lands he raises the important point that such attempts will fail if the recipient society’s culture is not hospitable to liberal institutions. This is a point that Hayekians tend to make, and one that both Hegel and Rousseau made. In fact, Wolff acknowledges Rousseau on this point by noting that the great philosopher knew that politics must be grounded in a common culture. However, Wolff points out that the diversity of modern society renders Rousseau’s project problematic and in turn advocates the Rawlsian position that a polity be grounded in the shared public reasoning of its citizens.
It is refreshing to have a world-class philosopher provide a lucid discussion of such important issues for public consumption.
In the video featured below, Stanford University Professor Joshua Cohen, one of the founders of the burgeoning field of epistemic democracy (Yale hosted a conference on the subject), explains that democracy draws heavily on political deliberations that occur in the informal spheres of discourse. In this light he takes up the issue of the extent to which the internet is helping to improve the democratic nature of our public discourse, which he assesses along four traditional dimensions (Beneath the video I summarize his analysis, as well as provide an extensive discussion of his claims and related issues):
1) The deliberative/rational nature of informal public discourse.
2) Equal and low cost access to information.
3) Equal opportunity to influence political discourse.
4) Public discussions ought to be founded on information of quality and depth.
Has the internet advanced the deliberative/rational nature of informal public discourse?
Here he finds the evidence inconclusive. He notes that the ideal situation would be one in which the blogosphere served as an arena in which those who disagreed engaged each other, because he believes that would allow participants to better understand their own views, as well as those of others; ultimately, it would promote greater toleration. On these matters I’m intrigued as to what other bloggers think, because I’ve seen a great deal of debate occurring among ideologically dissimilar bloggers and these often devolve into petty and nasty debates where each party becomes less tolerant, more extreme, and even less knowledgeable of the other party’s arguments.1
I wonder why this is the case, because this fact runs contrary to what most deliberative democrats would predict. Perhaps the impersonal nature of the internet as a communication medium encourages or at least allows people to be harsher towards those with whom they disagree. The familiarity that comes with directly engaging someone may tend to breed respect but perhaps the internet fails to provide the conditions for such feelings of familiarity to emerge or to be deeply felt if they do exist, which might explain why erstwhile friends often have heated ideological arguments on Facebook.
An alternative explanation goes to the heart of political disagreement itself. According to this view, when people disagree about political matters it is because they are each operating with a different network of ideas through which they interpret and render intelligible a complex reality that would otherwise appear as a booming, buzzing confusion.2 Such a network of ideas, which we can term an ideology or world-view, provides one with a clear, distinct and easily accessible interpretation of the facts such that alternative interpretations come to appear as grounded in the stupidity, maliciousness or selfishness of those holding them. This alternative model of deliberation may help to explain why we find people engaged in sustained and heated disagreements even under conditions of direct engagement.
In their latest work, Dennis Thompson and Amy Gutmann argue that while parties who are familiar with and respect each other may disagree those aspects of their feelings for each other make it possible for them to compromise. They give the infamous example of Ronald Reagan and Tip O’Neill who were able to come together and compromise on a major tax reform bill despite their deep disagreement with each other.
However, partisans on the internet, by and large, are unlikely to engage each other under the conditions in which genuine feelings of familiarity and mutual respect will develop and are unlikely to have any practical reasons to compromise. Given the absence of these enabling conditions and the fact that disagreeing parties disagree because of divergent world-views it seems unlikely that such parties by engaging each other will tend to come to better understand each other’s opinions or to become more tolerant of competing views. Rather, under the conditions of internet discourse we should not be surprised to find partisans becoming more extreme in their views and less tolerant of competing opinions.
In response one could claim that those partisan disagreements can be reconciled once they emerge from the informal realm of discourse into the formal realm, but it is also the case that what comes to be believed in the informal realm can significantly constrain what can be done in the formal realm, and I think the role the tea party has played in influencing the politics of the Republican party is a perfect example here. The political impact of the tea party also raises another issue which is the degree to which the political blogosphere is a series of hermetically sealed echo chambers and to the extent that it is what does that bode for democratic discussion?
As Cohen notes, most political blogs primarily link to posts and articles written by like-minded intellectuals. Although he recognizes that in theory such cloistering inclines people toward more extreme views he points out that most internet discussions occur among like-minded thinkers because ‘bloggers are a select community of strong partisans’, which suggests that the nature of blogging itself is not necessarily the cause of such cloistering. His reasoning seems to be that these partisan bloggers would be strong partisans in the absence of the blogosphere. He also claims that except in the work place we tend to be surrounded by people who share our political beliefs and thus there is no reason to believe that the self-cloistering on the internet has increased the degree of partisanship.
However, I am wary of Cohen’s qualified optimism, because as people shift from receiving their political information from mainstream media outlets to receiving it from political blogs–given that most will turn to blogs that share their ideological biases–they will become ever more extreme views. On this account stands to reason that the growth of the blogosphere may be causing ever increasing levels of partisanship.3 Relatedly, Cohen notes that the network of bloggers tends to be a community of strong partisans, but that says nothing about the followers of blogs who may have been less partisan in the absence of their exposure to political blogs.
Sunstein describes a study he helped conduct in two Colorado cities: Boulder (relatively liberal) and Colorado Springs (relatively conservative). The research team took a group of liberals from Boulder and a group of conservatives from Colorado Springs and asked each participant their views on three controversial issues. Afterwards, they put the liberals in a room with the liberals and did the same for the conservatives. The participants were given instructions to freely discuss the issues on which they had just been interviewed. Following the deliberations each participant was again asked to express his views on the three issues. Here are the three major findings as reported by Sunstein:
(1) Liberals, in Boulder, became distinctly more liberal on all three issues. Conservatives, in Colorado Springs, become distinctly more conservative on all three issues. The result of deliberation was to produce extremism — even though deliberation consisted of a brief (15 minute) exchange of facts and opinions! (I am speaking here of shifts in anonymous statements, not of shifts between individual views and group views — though groups were also more extreme than their individual members, predeliberation.)
(2) The division between liberals and conservatives became much more pronounced. Before deliberation, the median view, among Boulder groups, was not always so far apart from the median view among Colorado City groups. After deliberation, the division increased significantly.
(3) Deliberation much decreased diversity among liberals; it also much decreased diversity among conservatives. After deliberation, members of nearly all groups showed, in their post-deliberation statements, far more uniformity than they did before deliberation.
We think that this little experiment is useful, because it shows how deliberation among like-minded people can increase extremism, intensify polarization, and also squelch internal disagreement.
My suspicion is that the exact same phenomenon is occurring through people’s engagements with blogs, but at this point this is a purely speculative suggestion and one that needs to be investigated empirically.
If my suspicion is born out we should find that Americans (and possibly most Westerners) have been becoming increasingly ideological over the years. In fact, one unintended consequence of the blogosphere may be that people are spending more time thinking about politics, which really means more time becoming good ideologues. This latter point assumes that people don’t tend to spend much time in their non-internet lives discussing politics, and the wonderful thing about blogs is that one can easily comment on posts and thus join the discussion without having to start a blog of one’s own. (This may suggest that the virtue of the internet along dimension three may in fact be aiding the cause of increasing extremism in politics.)4
Has the internet helped equalize the equalize and lowered the cost to information?
Here the internet seems to have done a great service to the democratization of our politics.
Has the internet equalized the opportunity for citizens to influence political discourse?
The internet has surely made it nearly as easy to provide a service as to use one, but there still seems to be just a handful of big players on the scene.
Has the internet provided a forum for public discussions founded on information of depth and quality?
Cohen laments the fact that the internet is killing the newspaper, because on his view a successful public sphere is impossible without investigative journalism, which he claims can only be produced by major media outlets and that the blogosphere is ill-equipped to provide. On this topic, one should watch the great documentary, Page One: Inside the New York Times.
I’d like to explore this question in more depth, because some political matters can be covered well by blogs such as policy debates. In this regard, bloggers are in a good position to employ social scientific research to assess policy debates so as to provide a more nuanced and sophisticated treatment of these matters than one traditionally gets from the major media outlets. And so long as one has the requisite intellectual abilities one can provide such a service solely with the aid of a computer, an internet connection and J-STOR access.5 So the question becomes what kind of investigative journalism does Cohen deem to be valuable? Surely, uncovering corruption is one thing that traditional journalism is very good at, but what other function does investigative journalism serve that cannot be taken on by bloggers?
This is not to suggest that there is not a great deal of value in investigative journalism in this respect, and I actually think that we’re approaching the point where some major foundations and billionaire philanthropists should convert NYT into a non-profit institution so that it can continue providing this excellent service to democracy.
1) I am not suggesting that this happens all the time, but I’ve witnessed this enough to deem it worth mentioning. I have seen instances in which such debates are very productive, but these tend to occur among philosophers and social scientists (or at least aspiring ones), but even these usually concern very technical issues. The problem with assessing such is matters, as Cohen notes, is that we don’t yet have much empirical research done in these areas to form competent judgments about the extent and nature of deliberation on the internet. I’d appreciate any help in finding such empirical studies.
2) For a discussion of these matters see, Walter Lippman’s Public Opinion; Philip Converse’s “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics“; and Jeffrey Friedman’s “Public Competence in Normative and Positive Theory: Neglected Implications of “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics””
3) And in fact Cohen acknowledges this point in his comments about how blogs are displacing newspapers, although for reasons I discuss below he laments this development.
4) As Converse famously demonstrated the vast majority of citizens are not ideologically constrained and are barely familiar with the most basic doctrines of liberalism and conservatism, and this lack of ideological constraint is a large part of why they are so ignorant. However, as Converse also notes, and as Jeff Friedman dramatically emphasized those who are ideologically constrained may be more knowledgeable but this comes at the price of their being more dogmatic. In other words, Rush Limbaugh may know a great many political facts, but most would doubt that his intensely ideological judgments of what we ought to do are worth very much.
5) Unfortunately, I cannot here discuss all the interesting and problematic issues this raises, particularly as it regards what these requisite intellectual abilities consists in; the nature and source of elite disagreement; and the competency of non-experts to adjudicate among such disagreements.